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Abstract 
 
This study simulates a CO2 permit market in Romania using a dynamic general equilibrium 
model. The carbon constraint is set at 20.7% below the reference emissions level for sectors 
eligible according to the EU-ETS (European Union Emission Trading Scheme). Free permit 
distribution enhances growth despite a severe emissions cap, because environmental 
regulation stimulates structural changes (Porter, 1991). That is, grandfathering allows sectors 
additional resources to invest in developing technologies, but it also raises the CO2 abatement 
costs because of energy rebound effects from enhanced growth. Results under endogenous 
growth (Romer, 1990) are very similar to those obtained under an exogenous growth scenario 
(Ramsey, 1928), as the substitution effects are responsible for the majority of variations; in 
addition, Romanian research activities are too modest to significantly impact this system. The 
abatement cost per unit of GDP is higher under endogenous growth, as spillover effects 
reduce incentives to invest. Technological diffusion continues to have a positive impact on 
economic growth, which counterbalances the free-riding attitude adopted by some energy-
intensive sectors, such as glass and cement.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The international environmental context has deeply changed with the ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol and the implementation of the European Union’s Emission Trading Scheme (EU-
ETS) in 2005. These agreements have greatly influenced national climate policy in Romania, 
especially since the country acceded to the European Union in 2007. Some national actions 
include the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol2 and the transposition into Romanian legislation 
of the European Directive that sets the terms of carbon trade (Directive 2003/87EC; EC, 
2003).  
As in most Eastern European countries, energy consumption in Romania has undergone a 
significant drop during the transition from a centrally planned economy to a market economy. 
This decrease is partly due to a decline in economic activity, particularly after the dissolution 
                                                 
1 45 bis, av. de la Belle Gabrielle, 94736 Nogent sur Marne, France. Email: rodica@centre-cired.fr. 
2 Romania ratified the UNFCCC (1994) and the Kyoto Protocol (2001) with the commitment to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions by 8% compared to 1989 levels over the period 2008-2012. 
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of CMEA (Council of Mutual Economic Assistance) in 1991, as well as to structural 
transformations that took place during the transition. Consequently, Romanian GHG emission 
levels decreased by 50% in 2002 relative to their 1989 levels. Besides industrial and 
economic transitions, energy supply transformations are also noteworthy, as the 
commissioning of the first nuclear power reactor in 1996 allowed the country to further 
reduce GHG emissions. Before the end of the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol 
(2012), it is likely that GHG emissions will be below the benchmark set for Romania, even 
given scenarios with high economic growth rates (RME, 2005; RME, 2006c). Yet after this 
period, rapid growth could lead to emissions levels 40% higher than the 2002 levels (RME, 
2006b).  
 
Romania has a diverse range of natural resources, such as oil, gas, coal, uranium and other 
significant renewable energy resources3 including hydraulic energy, that ensures up to 67.7% 
of the country’s energy independency (2003). The lifetime of these resources is estimated at 
240 years for coal, 121 years for lignite and 122 years for uranium, while it is only 14 years 
for both oil and gas4 (RME, 2006a). In this context, coal and uranium are the main energy 
resources for the country’s energy balance; as such, two new nuclear plants are scheduled for 
2010 and 2015 (RME, 2006b). As coal remains the main energy resource in the long run, the 
study of the evolution of emissions is essential to ensure long-term, sustainable economic 
development. Thus, the main objective of this research project is to estimate the costs of 
carbon reduction using two growth scenarios of the Romanian economy. Environmental 
policies are tested within these two scenarios by focusing on quantities and prices. One 
consists in the implementation of a CO2 permit market; the other consists in the introduction 
of a tax on CO2 emissions. 
 
Note that technological progress can reduce the costs of abatement (Goulder and Schneider, 
1999). Most models confirm that the cost reduction is sensitive to the level of technological 
change, concluding that pollution reduction is accelerated through the spillover effects that 
technological progress generates. In contrast, other models assign a major role to the 
abatement functions of interfactorial substitution effects (Nordhaus, 2002).  
The recent literature on this topic presents technological progress as the main factor affecting 
the evolution of and reduction in greenhouse gas emissions because of the scarcity of energy 
options with low carbon emissions (Tietenberg et al., 1999). Analyses of the tradable permit 
market have shown that innovation can reduce abatement costs, because environmental 
research tends to reduce emissions, increase the supply of permits and lower the equilibrium 
price (Buonanno et al., 2003; Manne and Richels, 2002). Environmental regulation can thus 
improve research policy, as it creates incentives for the development of new technologies 
(Porter, 1991). However, some have shown that environmental constraints do not necessarily 
improve environmental research, because the pace of innovation slows down as energy prices 
rise and research spending diminishes (Kohler et al., 2006; Popp, 2002).  
 
The impact of technological progress on the economy depends on the level of technological 
diffusion. Spillover effects are considered to be a growth factor, even if they generally reduce 
incentives to innovate. From a climate policy perspective, the diffusion of innovations leads 
to a higher permit price, because diffusion creates and stimulates so-called “free-riding” 
                                                 
3 Primary energy resource shares in 2003 are: 34.8% gas, 25.7% oil, 23.4% coal and 5.1% for hydroelectric and 
nuclear-electric energy. National production is around 5.2 million tonnes per year for oil and 12.9 billion m³ for 
gas.  
4 The country’s reserves are estimated at 73.7 million tonnes for oil and to 184.9 billion m³ for gas (RME, 
2006a). 
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behaviour. This leads to a lower supply of tradable permits, thus increasing the equilibrium 
price. The macro-level impact is the opposite; spillover effects lower total abatement costs 
due to the positive effects they induce on growth (Buonanno et al., 2003).  
 
Theoretical models show that spillover effects positively affect growth, but in practice, 
growth is dependent on past innovations as well as on capital stock. This latter concept 
defines progress as an inertial evolution that is difficult to change (Ha-Duong et al., 2004). 
That is, even if cheaper and more effective technologies are available, old technologies linger 
on because of their sunk costs. This blocked entry of new technologies is conventionally 
called a “lock-in effect” (Weyant and Olavson, 1999). Yet, despite this inertial aspect to 
growth, abatement measures can encourage the substitution of fossil-based technologies with 
cleaner technologies as well as can help reduce the price of technological progress by 
highlighting that learning and innovation are cost-saving activities.  
 
Thus, debates aimed at developing an optimal abatement trajectory involve two opposing 
perspectives on action, namely, immediate action (“act now”) versus initiatives undertaken in 
the future (“wait and see”). Abatement costs appear lower in the future due to increased 
technical progress, which seem to justify fewer abatement efforts in the short-term (Manne 
and Richels, 2002; Wigley et al., 1996). However, efforts to reduce emissions are increasingly 
beneficial the longer they have been enacted (Goulder, 2004), while the adoption of 
environmental measures can encourage the adoption of cleaner technologies. This increases 
the speed of technology diffusion and accelerates abatement in the long-term (Goulder and 
Schneider, 1999). 
 
This research further explores the effect of technological change on climate policies and 
abatement cost in Romania using a general equilibrium framework. Through intertemporal 
dynamics, the model exogenously simulates active population growth (Ramsey, 1928) and 
endogenously introduces the technological progress originating in fundamental research 
(Romer, 1990). To explicitly describe the permit market, the model adopts appropriate 
disaggregation criteria and builds a multi-sector structure, as discussed in section 2. Two 
distribution rules are tested, including allowances that are freely distributed among sectors, as 
mostly provided within the European Trading Scheme (ETS) until 2012, as well as 
allowances that are auctioned to participants, as per the European Commission’s goal to 
gradually increase auctioning until 2020 (EC, 2008). Tax and permit analysis drive the two 
modelling growth motors so that auctions act as a carbon tax when permits are sold at the 
same price, as described in section 3. Final remarks on the findings as well as policy 
recommendations are presented in the final section.  
 
2. Theoretical specifications of the model and data  
 
The neoclassical growth model is often attributed to Ramsey (1928), Cass (1965) and 
Koopmans (1965); in fact, it is a reduced form of a saving-investment model with a single 
infinitely-lived representative agent. Another analytical understanding of growth was 
developed by Solow (1956) with a focus on the productivity of production factors. In both the 
Ramsey and Solow models, the long-run growth rate depends on exogenous technological 
progress and population growth rates. The neoclassical model was developed further by 
Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988), Aghion and Howitt (1992), Grossman and Helpman (1991), 
and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992). These new growth theory models explained growth 
endogenously using three mechanisms: capital accumulation externalities, human capital 
accumulation and the existence of a stock of knowledge. This literature assumes that 
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technological progress is a production process and that there is a common stock of knowledge 
possessed by society. Human capital acts on economic growth first by participating in 
production process and second by increasing productivity through the research, innovation 
and diffusion of new technologies. Knowledge stock, moreover, is a public good that 
generates spillover effects derived from capital accumulation; it compensates for decreases in 
the marginal productivity of capital and allows the economy to grow at positive rates in the 
long-run.  
 
Applications of this new growth theory to environmental issues began in the 1990s with 
Nordhaus (1999), Goulder and Schneider (1999), Goulder and Mathai (2000), Buonanno et al. 
(2003). These studies endogenously analyse firm reactions to an increase in energy prices that 
resulted in improving energy efficiency through research and development investment 
(R&D). These applications to energy and the environment are based on a relationship among 
R&D supply, human capital, growth rates and environmental regulations; they focus on the 
effects of public policies on technical changes that depend on the market structure, 
investments and the actions and anticipations of individuals. For instance, the implementation 
of a carbon tax increases energy prices and stimulates the demand for innovation; innovations 
in cleaner technology are then encouraged, depending on the profitability of the 
corresponding patents. Among these models, top-down approaches are the most explicitly 
cited as well as the least abstract methods for modelling technological progress (Weyant and 
Olavson, 1999). General equilibrium models in particular can more precisely take into 
account socio-economic contexts as well as growth feedback, both of which are important, 
because technological change usually influences economic and social progress.  
 
Our modelling framework retains the three growth assumptions discussed in Goulder and 
Schneider (1999), namely, the accumulation of physical capital (standard), the development 
of intangible capital (knowledge stock) and the exogenous growth of the active population. 
Our dynamic structure has an infinitely-lived representative household, as in the Ramsey 
model (1928), and introduces population growth into the R&D model of Romer (1990). The 
main difference between our model and most other models involves the nature of knowledge 
stock. Here, we relate knowledge stock to fundamental research activities that develop and 
integrate technological innovations. That is, environmental policies have general effects on 
growth but do not explicitly influence depolluting efforts through specific technologies. Two 
main factors inform this assumption: the lack of sector data on environmental R&D 
investment in Romania and the absorption capacity of new technologies in all branches due to 
restructuring processes.   
 
Our model describes the innovation mechanisms through which the production of knowledge 
and its diffusion influences the development of capital and causes inter-sectoral spillover 
effects. Romer’s model is adapted here to a multi-sector economy structure as well as to a 
different type of factor disaggregation; still, the growth mechanism is similarly based on 
human capital and knowledge accumulation and diffusion. That is, in our model, individuals 
have an infinite time horizon with perfect forward-looking anticipations, but contrary to the 
Ramsey model, labour is endogenously supplied over time, and the economy is open to the 
trade with the rest of the world. Since Romania is a small economy, world-market goods 
prices are exogenous, and the substitutability between domestic and imported goods is 
imperfect (Armington, 1969). Production factors are fully mobile across sectors. All prices in 
the model are in relative terms, and the wage rate is the numeraire in the model. Production is 
disaggregated into 14 sectors: electricity, coal, oil, gas, metallurgy, glass, cement, paper, 
chemistry, transports, agriculture, construction, services and other activities. To model 
 5
innovation, we introduce two additional sectors, research and development. The research 
sector produces inventions, such as patents or technological knowledge, which are sold to the 
development sector in order to produce new technologies for a final goods sector. Equations 
are presented in Appendix 2. 
 
The representative consumer receives a fixed share of dividends from the final goods sectors, 
including wages paid by the final goods producer, monopoly profits from the development 
sector, as well as transfers from the state and firms. Households maximise the net of 
environmental gains utility by making a trade-off between leisure and consumption under the 
assumption of a constant fixed elasticity of substitution (CES). The consumption basket is 
aggregated following CES function properties. Welfare is calculated using the Hicksian 
measure of equivalent income variation. 
 
The final goods sector is described using a constant returns-to-scale production function 
following the KLEM approach, as it is the most commonly adopted approach in the energy 
literature (Nordhaus, 1992; Burniaux et al., 1992; Lee et al., 1994; Beaumais, 1995; 
McKibbin and Wilcoxen, 1995). Its nested structure follows the same principle in all final 
goods sectors (see Appendix 1). At the highest nest, production (Yj) is a fixed composition of 
intermediate materials Mj and aggregate materials KLEj. The capital–energy composite (KEj) 
can be traded off with labour, yet to a lesser extent in capitalistic sectors. A new element is 
added to standard physical capital to each sector j, namely, development capital that 
represents the fraction jθ  of the aggregate materials out of all innovative capital varieties (A) 
produced by the development sector (Ydev):  
( )
11/ 11 1 11 1 1
2 (1 )
KE
KE KE KEj j j j j j j j jKE A e E k K e k A Ydev
ε
ε ε εα α α α θ
⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠− − −⎡ ⎤= + + − − ⋅ ⋅⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
The variable A indicates the effects of knowledge stock from the research sector on the final 
goods technology that ensures the diffusion of spillover effects.  
 
The carbon market functions as a zero-sum game, meaning that the more CO2 a sector emits, 
the greater are the efforts required from other sectors to decrease their emissions.  
∑∑ =−
j i
jiji COCO 0)22( ,, ,  
where jiCO ,2 is the number of free allowances and ,2i jCO  is the emissions of sector j that 
employs a production technology using energy input i. 
We assume that the producer modifies energy prices according to value of permits subject to 
the constraint that at equilibrium, the firm’s profit is null. This means that the scarcity rent 
(i.e., the value of granted permits) is also integrated into the price frontier at the lowest level 
of the production structure. This technique appears efficient from an economic point of view, 
because price signal is transmitted downstream into production technology, encouraging 
substitutions between energy inputs and capital or labour (Burniaux et al., 1992). Another 
option is to consider the permit or tax as an input to the production function, as in McKibbin 
and Wilcoxen (1995) and Nordhaus (1992).  
The optimisation function is as follows: 
1
1 1 1/1
, , , , 3 , ,( 2 2 . . /
Ej
Ej
Ej j i j i j i j i j j j Ei j i j
i i
Min P E cin Pci Pper CO CO s c E A cin
ε
εα
−−⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟= + − =⎣ ⎦ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
∑ ∑ , 
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where PE is energy price, E is energy input, icin  is the intermediate consumption of resource i 
(including coal, gas, electricity, or oil), Pper is the permit price, which is the same for all 
sectors, and Pci is the price of input i. The product ,2i j
i
Pper CO∑  is defined as the scarcity 
rent, and the expression , ,( 2 2 )i j i j
i
Pper CO CO−∑  represents the sector permit balance, which 
might be either positive or negative, meaning that a sector is a buyer or seller on the permit 
market, respectively. The optimal demand function regarding energy consumption follows the 
CES formula; it is modified here with an increase in production possibilities due to free 
allowances and a reduction with the permit value weighted with the input coefficients of 
emissions (coef): 
1
, ,
,
4 , ,
( 2 ) EjEj Ei j Ej j i j
j i
i j
j i j i j
P E Pper COE
cin
A Pci Pper coef
ε
ε α− ⎡ ⎤+⎛ ⎞ ⎢ ⎥= ⎜ ⎟ ⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ + ⋅⎝ ⎠ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
∑
. 
The formalisation of the tradable permit market is based here on the implicit cost of 
abatement; other models consider the explicit form of cost reduction based on the assumption 
that agents have different options in abating pollution (Ellerman and Decaux, 1998). This 
assumption is applied on a global scale in order to compute the specific cost of abatement for 
each region, country or sector. Each abatement potential is used to establish the quantity of 
quotas allowed to participants in the permit trade. The implicit, unique cost employed in our 
model is justified by the fact that the potential for abatement is ex ante established, as it is 
proportional to historical emissions and equivalent to the abatement objective of 20.7% from 
the reference emissions.  
 
The introduction of carbon taxes is similar to the permit market described above, except that 
initial allocation is zero. The analogy with permit auctioning is perfect if all permits are 
auctioned at the same price. The relationship between the abatement costs and the tax level 
follows the principle underlying the quantity-based approach.  
 
At the lowest nest of the production technology, the energy inputs are a CES–Armington 
aggregation of domestic and imported inputs. The source of carbon dioxide emissions is the 
primary inputs from all energy sectors5. It is assumed that emissions are proportional to the 
amount of primary energy used in each sector. The environmental policy is also applied to 
imported fossil fuels, since their combustion takes place domestically. It is assumed that both 
domestic and imported energy inputs have the same emission coefficients in order to avoid 
substituting domestic inputs for imported inputs due to environmental regulation evasions.  
 
The sector investment is the result of a firm’s trade-off between the development of capital 
goods, on the one hand, and conventional capital accumulation, on the other hand. Most 
capital represents the last form of investment, which at each period meets the demand for 
depreciated capital. This form of capital affects productivity only through a substitution 
effect, while development goods improve productivity through spillover effects. 
 
Dynamic specifications are adopted according to active population evolution (exogenous 
growth) and technological knowledge accumulation (endogenous growth). From an empirical 
point of view, active population dynamics are limited by the demographical decline recorded 
                                                 
5 The electricity sector includes parts of the gas distribution network, and thus, some CO2 emissions are 
associated with this sector and its output. 
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in Romania after 1990. However, the active population is assumed to be increasing, as the 
current unemployment rate is officially set around 8% but is unofficially at 40% (Stanculescu 
and Berevoescu, 2004). The active population growth rate is thus calculated to be positive 
with an annual rate set at 0.1%.  
 
A representative household maximises its intertemporal utility subject to intertemporal 
budgets constraint defined by the following per capita variables: 
1
,
1 1
1, 1,
1 1 ( , )
1 (1 )
(1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( )/
(1 ) (1 )
t t
t ttC l t
t t
t t t t t t t t t
t ts s
s t s t
M a x U u C l
n p k K H w l T R S r n p c C S a vH T R S ps c
r r
θ
θ ρ
−
− −
= =
= − +
+ + + + + +=+ +
∑
∑ ∑∏ ∏
, 
where θ  is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, ρ  is the time preference rate, r is the 
discounting rate, TRSr and TRSp are household received and paid transfers, respectively, Sav 
is individual savings, pk is capital price, KH is received dividends, and w l⋅ is the net total 
wage. 
Consumption is the aggregate of goods from the final goods sector that are combined into a 
CES function that takes into account intratemporal budget constraints at each period t. The 
dynamics of aggregate consumption C are determined by the Euler equation as follows: 
( )1 11 1
1
1 1
11
1 1
1 1
1
11(1 )(1 )
1
1
1
t
tt
t t T
t t
t
pc
wpcC C n g
r pc pc
w
σθ
σ σθσσ σ
σθ σθ
σ
ββ β βρ
ββ β β
− ⎛ ⎞− +⎜ ⎟+ ⎝ ⎠
+ + ++
+ −
+
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥− + ⎜ ⎟−⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞+ ⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠= + + ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎢ ⎥+ ⎛ ⎞⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ⎢ ⎥− + ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥−⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
, 
where gT denotes the growth rate at the final period T that deflates consumption value at each 
period; other notations includeβ  for the share of leisure in consumer utility and σ  for the 
substitution elasticity between leisure and consumption. This equation shows the trade-off 
between present and future consumption as a direct function of three factors: the ratio 
between the time preference rate and the future discounting rate, the ratio between the 
aggregate price of consumption in present and future, and the ratio between the price-
weighted index of consumption and the leisure price.  
 
At the firm level, capital accumulation is based on backward-looking specifications, function 
of the rate of capital depreciation and the initial capital stock: 
[ ] [ ]1 (1 ) / (1 )(1 )t t t TK I K n gδ+ = + − + + . 
 
The endogenous growth framework based on Romer (1990) supposes an increase in the 
productivity of all inputs. The development mechanism includes three assumptions: 1) 
technological change induces growth, 2) the market values resulting innovations, and 3) 
knowledge acts as a non-rival input into the research sector. These assumptions are the heart 
of endogenous growth theory: non-rival knowledge implies a free diffusion of externalities in 
which effects spread directly into the research sector and indirectly into the final goods sector. 
 
The research sector employs capital and labour factors in a constant returns-to-scale Cobb-
Douglas specification in order to produce A
i
 patents, that is, 1A Lr Kr Aα αγ −=i . Knowledge 
stock (A) is freely employed at each period, as it is non-rival and non-exclusive in this sector, 
but it becomes perfectly exclusive when it is valued on the market. The research sector 
benefits from externalities generated by knowledge stock that are partly internalised through 
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public subsidies; patent marginal cost equals prsr )1( τ+ , where pr is the selling price of the 
patent to the development sector.  
 
The development sector is represented by different firms; each of them purchases one patent 
and produces one variety of development goods. The number of these firms increases with the 
number of patents resulting from the research sector. Romer’s model explicitly uses a 
monopoly structure to describe this sector’s activities, because profit becomes the only 
motivation to produce capital goods even though one cannot perfectly value the externalities 
generated by the output of these firms. 
Each firm’s production technology requires a specific patent, labour, capital as well as 14 
other inputs issued from the productive sector, much like final goods producers. As in the 
reference model, for simplicity we assume that there are A firms, each of which produces the 
same product quantity (Ydev) at the same marginal cost (Pbiv). Total production is an additive 
function, 
1
A
i
Yiv Ydev A Ydev
=
= = ⋅∑ . 
The total profit maximisation function takes account of symmetric production conditions: 
( ( ) )tot mon bivYiv YivMax Max P Yiv P Yivπ = − . 
The usual monopoly specifications are introduced. The market price Pmon equals the 
marginal production cost adjusted according to the elasticity of development goods demand in 
the final goods sector: ( )/ 1 1 /mon iv KEP P σ= − . 
Intertemporal profits discounted with the interest rate equal total patent costs, as follows: 
1
/ (1 )
t
t s t
t s
r prπ
=
+ =∑ ∏  
Market power in the monopolistic development sector forces the private optimum to diverge 
from the social optimum. This dynamic is corrected through state subsidies granted for the 
purchase of development goods that maintains the monopolistic incentives to produce. Selling 
price then equals production cost: (1 )s db iv m o nP Pτ= − .  
 
The growth mechanism allows the economic system to evolve at the rate of knowledge 
accumulation, gt: 11
1
t t
t t t
t
A Ag Lr Kr
A
α αγ −−
−
−= = . 
The resolution of a dynamic module implies the deflation of variables with the growth rates, 
that are n for the active population and gT for the long-run innovation growth rate. This 
technique allows us to compute per capita values of variables and to compare them with the 
reference values. The modified golden rule thus takes the form
11(1 )(1 )
1
T
T
rg n
σ
σθ
ρ
+⎛ ⎞++ + = ⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠ , 
where Tr  is the interest rate at the last period, θ  is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, 
ρ  is the time preference rate, and σ is the elasticity of substitution between leisure and 
consumption. 
 
Equilibrium conditions are set at four levels. Goods and services markets are cleared in 
volume by equalising supply with demand as well as in value through factor price frontier. 
Labour and capital markets are cleared in value as shown in annex 2.  In the current scenario, 
external debt is set to zero at each period. The equilibrium between savings and investments is 
set by adjusting the interest rate; the solvability of the model is assured by replacing this 
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condition with the Walras law that checks the general equilibrium at each period through a 
control variable, denoted as walras: 
1 / (1 ) ( )t t t t t t t T t t twalras pinv InvS piv Yiv prd A g SavS SavH SavE−= + + + − + + . 
 
Terminal conditions, which are necessary for approximating the infinite time horizon with a 
finite numerical model, are taken into account here by using the modified golden rule for 
consumer accounts as well as the usual identity ( )T TInv n Kδ= +  for investment accounts. 
Alternative terminal constraints have been developed by Lau et al. (2002) and Böringher et al. 
(2007) based on a mixed complementarity problems (MCP) that endogenises the growth rate 
at the last period. The investment growth rate at the last period equals the growth rate of 
capital, production or any other stable quantity variable, or 1 1/ /T T T TI I Y Y− −= . Using this 
terminal condition shows similar results for fewer periods as compared to the usual non linear 
programming solver (NLP); for example, 17 periods under NLP represent 10 periods under 
the MCP approach. Applying these two terminal conditions to our model indicates that the 
number of periods is high enough to ensure the convergence and it indicates no sensitivity to 
the terminal condition. Our simulations were conducted using GAMS/MCP software (Brooke 
et al., 1998) and the PATH solver.  
 
2.2. Calibration procedure 
 
The social accounting matrix (SAM) is built based on data provided by the Romanian 
National Accounts for the year 2003 (NIS, 2006a). Production prices in all final goods sectors 
are normalised to unity, and the intermediate consumption prices are computed in line with 
the factor price frontiers following a bottom-up approach. The calibration of volumes and 
flows between the producer, the state, households, saving-investment accounts and the rest of 
the world are based on values issued from the SAM. 
 
The elasticities of substitution are derived from energy studies that have been applied to 
industrialised countries (Bohringer and Rutherford, 1997; Kemfert and Welsch, 2000; 
Piazolo, 2000). Some rates are modified according to particular empirical frameworks; these 
frameworks take into account rapid economic transformations during transition, enterprise 
restructuring, and technology modernisation that involve deep transformations in the structure 
of various economic and other factors. In terms of intermediate energy consumption, 
producers tend to favour electricity in the long-run together with the replacement of imported 
gas technologies by hydro and nuclear capacities (RME, 2005, 2006a). Energy efficiency 
gains are expected in all sectors; investment needs for technology modernisation justify 
capital substitution for a fixed parameter of 1.3 in the oil sector and 2.6 in the energy 
intensive sectors. Labour substitution is significant in light industries and services (σ =2), but 
it is less important in the agriculture, as this sector already employs 35% of the active 
population and thus has a limited absorption capacity. The trade-off between imported and 
domestic products is in favour of imports for gas and oil (σ =0.7) and in favour of domestic 
goods in agriculture (2.5) and construction (2.7). Intratemporal trade-offs between leisure and 
consumption are in favour of the latter when the substitution value is set at 1.9. With data for 
prices, volumes and substitution elasticities, the calibration of parameters follows the usual 
procedure employed for CES and Leontief functions. 
    
Endogenising R&D-based growth increases the difficulties in calibrating the key parameters 
(Gillingham et al., 2008; Otto et al., 2008). Our parameterisation is inspired from the Mage’s 
(2004) application of Romer’s model to international trade.  
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Knowledge production at the current period is calibrated using the relation 
2002
2003 2003 t
t
A g A= ∑ , which indicates that the innovations at the reference period are the 
product between the growth rate and the stock of knowledge accumulated until 2003. 
Knowledge stock includes past R&D expenses starting with 1995 and equals 
2002
1995
t
t
A
=
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ . 
Table 1. Research expenses in Romania  
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Current price s in 1210 lei 0.577 0.768 1.465 1.833 2.196 2.962 4.593 5.743 7.621 
Source: NIS, 2006b.  
 
The consideration of patents as a market product is appropriate for the Romanian context only 
in the late 1990s after the adoption and application of competition laws on property rights 
(RMT, 2006). Before these laws, research output was a public good. Restrained time-interval 
knowledge stock is compensated by the fact that the depreciation of innovations is not taken 
into account; in practice, this depreciation rate is relatively high at about 12% (Nadiri and 
Prucha, 1996). We implicitly assume that stock of knowledge capital by sector changes very 
slowly: once capital is installed, the time lag necessary to switch equipment is rather long, 
given inertia in technological changes. Since the growth rate in 2003 is about 5%, knowledge 
stock is estimated to one, while the price of innovation is calibrated at around 3.8, net of 
subsidies. For comparison, the standard capital price is close to unity. In Nordhaus (1992), the 
cost of research is multiplied by four in comparison with conventional investment prices, 
reflecting market imperfection. Subsidies are assessed against public funds in the research 
sector, which in 2003 obtained about 50% of its production costs from the state (NIS, 2006b).  
 
Production technology in the development sector resembles the input-output structure of high-
technology sectors (NIS, 2006a). Its production cost calibration is in line with the production 
principles in the final goods sector, and the sector’s monopoly price is obtained by summing 
the monopoly rent. The last calculation equalises state aide and rate amounts to 0.64 of the 
marginal production cost.  
Investments in research are reported as investments in physical capital, so to equilibrate the 
SAM, investment accounts are debited with respective research expenses. As for investments 
in development goods, these are included in the intermediate consumption of high-technology 
goods, thereby the new equilibrium debits the intermediate consumption matrix. 
 
3. Simulations and discussion 
 
The simulated environmental policy sets a constraining goal of 20.7% of emissions of the 
base-year level, which corresponds to the target set by the Romanian National Allocation Plan 
according to the EU-ETS (RME, 2006c; EC, 2007). This constraint is applied to eligible 
sectors, namely, electricity, refineries, metallurgy, glass, cement and pulp and paper 
production. Simulations are conducted for 40 periods, with shock gradually applied between 
2008 and 2012. The application of taxes is analogous to permit auctioning, since all permits 
are auctioned at the same price. We first analyse the implementation of environmental 
regulation under endogenous growth as compared with the reference year 2003 (3.1.) and then 
compare these results with those obtained using an exogenous growth approach (3.2.). 
Selected results are presented in Appendix 3. 
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3.1. Prices versus quantities in an endogenous growth approach 
 
In order to generate comparable results, the same environmental benefit is set for both tax and 
free permit scenarios. This represents an abatement of 19.8 Mt CO2 from eligible sectors, 
resulting in a marginal abatement cost of 3.8 euros for the tax scenario and 5.8 euros for the 
permit scenario. The difference in equilibrium price between the grandfathering and the 
permit auction cases is explained by the different volumes of traded permits between the two 
scenarios, which are 2.28 M and 56.3 M permits, respectively.  
 
Economic growth follows different trajectories. It drops in the tax scenario (-0.33%) but 
increases in the free permit scenario (0.15%). Two main features can explain the positive 
effect on economic growth in the free permit scenario, namely, market flexibility and the 
grandfathering scheme used to allocate initial permits. Market flexibility is due to the 
differences in abatement costs across sectors. Permit trading exploits this difference, thereby 
reducing CO2 emissions in those sectors with the fewest cost abatement opportunities. Thus, 
the allowance of free permits increases flexibility as compared with the tax scenario (Baker et 
al., 2008). Similarly to Wing’s (2003) study, we find that the introduction of a carbon tax 
reduces R&D investments; this slows technological change and output growth.   
 
Figure 1. The evolution of the growth rate (%, reference = 5 %) 
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The policy applied at the sixth period has an announced character and thereby agents are able 
to anticipate the future system of prices and adapt their behaviour accordingly. Research and 
development activities are affected during the shock (2008-2012); since this shock is applied 
early, agents have only a few periods to adjust their behaviours. 
In the permit scenario, households anticipate an increase in aggregate consumer price during 
the shock as well as a post-2012 decrease in this price; thus, consumption follows an inverse 
evolution. It decreases with the anticipation of a price increase, and it rises after the shock due 
to a decrease in prices (Fig. 2). Decreased consumption at the beginning of this interval 
causes savings to increase and enhances positive growth. Increased savings during this period 
is also the result of an anticipated increase in interest rate, meaning that investments are 
encouraged when interest rates are lower. Additionally, anticipating an increased patent price 
for innovations implies more profits for the research sector, which encourages production and 
positively effects growth. The growth rate is continuously positive even if consumption 
volume decreases during the first 10 years due to the positive effect of agents on the health of 
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the future pricing system. In the end, after both the shock and the subsequent recovery from 
the shock, research output decreases and the volume of development goods increases, which 
indicates a lower number of produced varieties and a higher quantity of innovative 
technologies compared to the reference value. We conclude that the economy grows more in 
terms of quantity than with regards to quality.  
 
The evolution is different in the tax scenario, as the payment of carbon taxes offers fewer 
investment possibilities to agents. With similar mechanisms of anticipation and adaptation, 
research and development activities decline as patent price decreases. Still, standard 
investments improve, because interest rates slightly drop over time. Anticipation of decreased 
R&D activities and increased energy prices forces firms to produce less, which negatively 
affects the growth rate. At the household level, agents anticipate more income, as increased 
tax revenue increases government resources, generating more social transfers available to 
households from governments. Other models, such as the G-Cubed model (McKibbin and 
Wilcoxen, 1995), assume that households are the direct owners of permit revenues, even if 
firms decide on the use of permits. Under this assumption, the impact is stronger on 
households, as households receive all permit revenues. In our simulations, the effect of 
increased consumption on the economy is positive but not strong enough to enhance 
production, investments and, finally, economic growth.  
 
At the sectoral level, the net permit sellers on the free permit market include the electricity, 
glass, cement and paper industries; they have the lowest abatement costs among eligible 
sectors as well as record gains on the market. The remaining sectors, namely, refineries and 
metallurgy, are net buyers of polluting rights. Despite severe constraints set on its emissions, 
electricity production grows due to the low emissions coefficients of its output, as so does 
glass and cement production due to the significant potential in energy efficiency of these 
sectors. Abatement increases the income generated by selling permits, which encourages 
investments in both standard and development forms of capital goods and thus results in 
substitution among possible energy inputs as well as diffusion of technological knowledge.  
In contrast, when permits are auctioned, all producers are affected, since all producers are 
buyers on the market. Changes in fiscal indicators due to carbon permit auctions creates a 
strong signal across all sectors, including those that are not constrained by the ETS policy. 
Increased production prices lower demand and sector investment capacity, which directly 
harms demand for development goods (-1.3%) and output research (-0.04%).  
 
The positive impact of environmental regulation is that increased production costs require 
firms to revise their production technologies, thereby becoming more resource-efficient. The 
new policy creates incentives to invest in development technologies. This encourages a better 
allocation of inputs as well as productivity gains due to spillover effects. This, of course, 
means that there have existed more efficient input allocations that were simply not exploited 
before the introduction of the new regulation. This supports Porter’s hypothesis (1991) that 
postulates that environmental regulation can ensure more efficient resource allocations as 
producers invest more in new technologies aimed at reducing their energy inefficiencies.  
• The implementation of a permit market forces firms to reorganise their intermediate 
consumption of resources in favour of non-polluting inputs, as electricity, capital and 
labour. This benefits overall demand (0.32%), the real GDP (0.06%), household 
consumption (0.13%), and economic growth (0.15%). Still, certain limitations remain, as 
growth does not systematically increase when environmental regulation hardens. Tests of 
higher regulatory constraints show an inverse relationship between environmental policy 
and economic growth. 
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• The carbon tax scenario does not substantiate the Porter hypothesis: economic growth (-
0.3%), the real GDP (-0.01%) and aggregate input (-0.84%) all drop. Moreover, 
employment decreases (-0.07%), and investment possibilities shrink. The nature of the 
underlying environmental regulations explains the divergence between these two scenario 
results (Ambec and Barla, 2001; Baker et al., 2008). The implementation of a tax 
introduces a certain level of rigidity, because its level is exogenously set for all sectors 
despite different abatement possibilities. Alternatively, the permit price is computed 
endogenously as a function of abatement costs that may differ across sectors. Flexibility is 
reinforced in the latter case by the fact that initial permit allocation is implemented by 
grandfathering.  
 
At the household level, welfare diminishes in the permit case (-0.13%) and improves in the 
tax scenario (0.58%). Imposing an environmental constraint generally enhances positive 
social costs, while individual welfare declines if no compensatory measures are applied. Our 
simulations show an opposite relationship in the tax scenario, mostly because improvements 
in consumption resulting from individual increased income grow with an increase in social 
transfers, as explained above. This result may also be rather surprising with regards to the 
permit scenario, because the variation in consumption is positive in the terminal period. The 
counterintuitive finding that welfare improves under a tax scenario but declines in the permit 
scenario is rather explained by shifts in the main indicators that comprise welfare.  
 
Figure 2. The evolution of household consumption (%, reference = 0) 
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Welfare is measured by intertemporal consumption income discounted by the interest rate. 
Understanding the trade-off between long-term and short-term consumption is necessary for 
evaluating efforts to reduce emissions within an intertemporal framework. This approach is 
commonly adopted in the climate change literature, and it actualises future income in order to 
give a present value to financial flows occurring in the future. Discounting with regards to the 
value of the actualisation rate is one of the most controversial issues in environmental 
economics, particularly after the publication of the Stern Review (Stern, 2007; Nordhaus, 
2007; Tol and Yohe, 2009). Low discount rates tend to accord more value to future 
generations as well as encourage investments, even relatively inefficient investments. Higher 
future values relate to higher rates of time preference and higher values of consumption, thus 
generally leading to inefficiencies in selecting investment policies. The present research 
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applies the usual exponential discounting form ( )1/ 1 tr+ to balance between present and 
future well-being. The values employed to generate the welfare indicator include 5.7% for the 
interest rate and 5.6% for the time preference. These values are close to those used by 
Goulder and Schneider (1999) and Lau et al. (2002), but they are higher than the Nordhaus 
(2007) calibration, which set the interest rate at 4.5% and the time preference at 3%.  
 
We next explain the effects of the main variables, including consumption, individual income 
and discounting rate, on welfare. 
 
According to the functions that describe consumer behaviour, two intratemporal trade-offs 
take place simultaneously: a trade-off between leisure and consumption, on the one hand, and 
a trade-off between saving and consumption, on the other hand. The first intratemporal trade-
off is done in favour of consumption; saving has an inverse propensity rate with regards to 
consumption, and so a decrease in consumption at the beginning of an interval translates into 
an increase in savings during this period as a response to growth investment needs. The 
evolution of consumption also implies an intertemporal trade-off between short-term and 
long-term consumption. Since consumers anticipate changes in prices, consumption paths are 
inversely correlated to the trajectory of prices changes. In the permit scenario, for instance, 
individuals anticipate a decrease in the long-term aggregate price and make a trade-off that 
favours long-term consumption. It is worth noting that price and growth trajectories are 
somewhat similar over time, as both increase until the shock period and then decrease during 
the shock (2008-2012). As growth slows down, savings habits are changed to so as to increase 
consumption, which further decreases consumer prices. Increased consumption encourages 
growth despite declines in household savings, partly because this increases the public deficit 
and partly because there is a growth self-perpetuating tendency that derives from the diffusion 
of spillover effects.  
 
The household income variation tends to zero in the permit scenario, but it increases in the tax 
scenario, mostly due to social transfers’ variations. Transfers vary positively in the tax 
scenario, since the state collects environmental tax revenues. In contrast, the permits trade 
does not generate fiscal assets to the state budget, and consequently, social transfers are lower 
as compared to the tax scenario. Intertemporal household income also increases in the tax 
scenario, because the discounting rate decreases, appreciating individual income. The 
differentiation in interest rate variations between the two scenarios shows divergent growth 
trajectories: enhanced growth in the permit scenario requires more investment (0.29%) as 
compared with the tax scenario (-0.07%), which implies a different evolutionary trajectory for 
the discounting rate.  
A decreased interest rate in the tax scenarios implies a higher decrease in household savings (-
0.8%) than in the permit scenario (-0.5%); this effect is reinforced by the deflationary impact 
of the policy, as the consumption is encouraged detrimental to saving.  
 
If consumption is used as the welfare measure, both policies would show positive effects in 
the terminal period of simulation. But this indicator does not take into account the transitory 
impacts of the policy, such as the decrease in consumption before the shock in the permit 
scenario. Dynamic, intertemporal accounting of the evolution of individual consumption 
income appears more appropriate to our analysis.  
 
From an energy and environment perspective, both carbon policies decrease emissions 
levels, but with different energy trends.  
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The permit market stimulates energy demand (2.3%), consequently to increased economic 
growth that induces an energy rebound effect. The energy demand increases mostly for 
electricity and oil. One must notice that the elasticities of substitution favour electricity as 
new nuclear reactors will begin to operate, ensuring about 5-7% of the actual electricity 
supply. The electricity price increase is the consequence of a rise in energy input prices; the 
primary energy structure is 14% coal, 17% oil and 18% gas. Coal production drastically drops 
despite small changes in production price; this is a demand-effect, due to coal high emission 
coefficients. 
The carbon tax decreases overall activities, but it leads also to more efficiency regarding the 
use of energy, as the energy per unit of GDP decreases (-5.9%). All energy resources decrease 
under this scenario due to the increase in energy prices, on the one hand, and reduced 
production activity in all sectors, on the other hand. In this way, the price of gas drops, but its 
demand declines as the result of output contractions across all sectors. This is explained by 
the high demand for gas relative to the total primary energy demand (34%). Similarly, 
electricity demand decreases, despite its low emission coefficient. 
 
Table 2. The volume of consumption and the domestic production price by energy resource 
Tax Permits Energy 
Consumption Production Imports Exports Price Consumption Production Imports Exports Price
Electricity -4.3 -4.4 6.3 -4.4 3.9 6.7 6.7 9.3 -1.0 0.6
Coal -19.4 -19.7 -18.6 -1.3 0.6 -22.0 -22.0 -21.8 -0.4 0.0
Oil -2.3 -2.6 -1.6 -1.6 0.9 0.2 0.0 0.6 -0.5 0.2
Gas -5.5 -5.3 -5.5 -0.6 -0.1 -1.3 -1.3 -1.3 -0.2 -0.1
 
Decreased coal consumption is a response to the constraining policy; as a result, it reduces 
emissions and changes the structure of the energy balance. However, it also potentially 
introduces national dependency on energy imports. Since coal represents Romania’s main, 
most abundant energy resource in the long-term, the current coal-based national strategy is 
justified; it encourages coal-fired power stations and provides them with carbon geological 
storage technologies, as Romania has the potential to store carbon underground. However, if 
these projects are deemed socially accepted, they would probably not be effective until 2020.  
Under the permit scenario, the country’s energy dependency as the ratio of energy imports to 
the total energy consumption deteriorates as domestic prices increase. In the tax scenario, the 
country’s energy dependency decreases due to contractions in production activities.  
Under both policies, exports decrease for all four energy sources modelled here because of 
depreciation in the national currency. Recall that both imported and domestic inputs are 
subject to carbon constraints. An imperfect substitution of imported energy resources for 
domestic ones is the result of the comparative advantage between domestic and world prices. 
But world prices are assumed to be fixed, as Romania is modelled as a small open economy. 
With regards to import structure, we notice an increase in the volume of electricity, but the 
country does not lose its status as a net exporter of electricity. Still, this result contradicts one 
of the national strategic goals to expand the electricity network as well as export capacities 
related to renewable or coal resources. If these scenarios do not follow long-term national 
strategy, complementary measures should be adopted in order to support the electricity sector. 
This may include fiscal measures or R&D subsidies in the short- or medium-term and 
political measures, such as implementing CCS technologies through international co-
financing.   
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We assume that economic growth through development technologies allows sectors to evolve 
at the global growth rate. If particular specifications are adopted on innovative abatement 
techniques, energy prices should decrease according to their degree of incorporation. This 
would imply a differentiation between the effects of fundamental research on sector 
productivity and the effect of environmental research on the efficiency gains of agents. 
Results should not be considerably different, as the energy and environmental programs 
represent only about 4.9% of total R&D expenses (NIS, 2006b). The modelling framework 
for fundamental research has been adapted in studies of transition countries that have an 
absorption capacity for the technological progress; still, results may be systematically low due 
to the aggregation of specific sector innovations with fundamental research.  
 
3.2 Endogenous versus exogenous growth 
 
The integration of the endogenous growth mechanism is usually highlighted through 
comparison with a scenario that includes exogenous progress. A similar comparison is carried 
out here by simulating two versions of our model, with one based on exogenous growth and 
the other based on endogenous growth. The analysis focuses on results obtained from the tax 
and permit scenarios in the terminal period of simulation in order to avoid transitory effects. 
The welfare indicator is the only variable that accumulates these transitory impacts.  
The framework built under the premise of exogenous growth assumes that the economy 
grows at a fixed rate indicated by the growth of the active population. This allows us to 
analyse substitution effects as response of the economy to environmental regulation (Exo). 
When the system evolves endogenously, spillover effects are added to substitution impacts 
(Endo). Comparing these two cases allows us to better describe the effects of technological 
diffusion generated by the research sector.  Several outcomes are noteworthy.  
 
1) Variations between the two versions are very close for most of the indicators in the permit 
scenario. However, the situation is more nuanced in the tax scenario, as the carbon signal is 
stronger and impacts are more pronounced (see Table 3). Using a similar approach, Nordhaus 
(2002) tested cases of endogenous and exogenous technological progress and showed that 
substitution is responsible for 99% of changes occurring in the system. This argument 
substantiates the similarities we see in our cases across endogenous and exogenous growth. 
To Nordhaus’s (2002) theoretical insights, we add the empirical fact that the investment 
innovative activities in Romania in 2003 were relatively weak (0.39% of the GDP), and thus, 
it is unlikely to have a major impact at the aggregate level. Similarly, Gillingham et al. (2008) 
argued that endogenising technical change may not greatly affect mitigation costs if other, 
relative prices do not change substantially.  
 
Table 3. Sector results from environmental instruments implementation (%) 
 
 Permit Market (Grandfathering) Taxation (Permit Auctioning) 
Production Investment     Permits (10³) Production 
cost 
Investment     Permits (10³) 
Endo Endo 
Sector 
Endo  Exo DvK  StandK Exo Endo Exo Endo  Exo DvK 
StandK 
Exo Endo Exo 
Electricity  6.7 6.72 7.78 8.17 8.23 -0.55 -1.13 -4.41 -4.44 0.95 2.54 2.41 41399.18 41399.8
Coal -22.01 -22.01 -22.01 -21.73 -21.69 0 0 -19.72 -19.72 -19.82 -18.56 -18.64 0 0 
Oil -0.03 -0.02 0.21 0.58 0.63 812.71 812.81 -2.62 -2.64 -2.08 -0.54 -0.65 3857.83 3857.48
Gas -1.28 -1.28 -1.59 -1.23 -1.19 0 0 -5.28 -5.28 -6.61 -5.14 -5.24 0 0 
Metallurgy -0.64 -0.62 0.8 1.16 1.22 1464.29 1465.04 -2.75 -2.77 2.55 4.17 4.05 8784.69 8783.36
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Glass 0.04 0.06 -0.58 -0.22 -0.17 -252.39 -252.4 -1.38 -1.43 -0.7 0.87 0.74 231.72 231.77
Cement 0.16 0.17 -0.97 -0.61 -0.57 -1897.46 -1897.71 -1.2 -1.22 1.02 2.61 2.51 1777.54 1778.48
Paper -0.15 -0.12 -0.39 -0.04 0.01 -126.61 -126.62 -1.16 -1.22 -0.95 0.6 0.5 228.25 228.32
Chemistry -0.26 -0.24 0.03 0.39 0.45 0 0 -1.48 -1.52 -0.07 1.5 1.37 0 0 
Transport -0.12 -0.1 -0.3 0.06 0.1 0 0 -0.48 -0.54 -1.47 0.07 -0.03 0 0 
Agriculture 0 0.04 -0.3 0.06 0.12 0 0 0.08 -0.01 -1.25 0.31 0.19 0 0 
Constructions 0.38 0.36 0.19 0.55 0.55 0 0 -0.24 -0.2 -1.38 0.17 0.16 0 0 
Services 0.05 0.07 -0.16 0.2 0.24 0 0 -0.06 -0.1 -1.28 0.27 0.17 0 0 
Other activities -0.15 -0.12 -0.3 0.05 0.11 0 0 -0.71 -0.76 -1.63 -0.09 -0.2 0 0 
 
Table 3 shows sector results based on the two different carbon policies in terms of production, 
investment and carbon-burden sharing. Sectors that are not eligible for permit trade record 
zero gains or costs on the market and are only indirectly affected by the constraining policy 
applied to other agents. All sectors reduce their emissions, except agriculture and construction 
under the permit scenario due to a demand-effect. Among non-eligible sectors, energy-
intensive sectors such as chemistry, transport and ‘other activities’ are most impacted, as the 
carbon price-signal is strong enough to influence their input preferences.  
Investments are implemented under exogenous growth using standard physical capital, while 
under endogenous growth, investments are split between standard and development capital. 
This increases the substitution possibilities between capital and energy as well as enhances 
spillover effects that may generate innovative technologies.  
 
2) The permit market simulation shows an improvement in welfare under exogenous growth 
but a decrease in welfare under endogenous growth. That is, the increased value of the 
discount rate under endogenous dynamics depreciates the intertemporal income of 
households. Yet, consumption increases at a slower rate. This is because the same 
environmental constraints in fact represent more stringent constraints in the exogenous 
growth scenario as compared to the endogenous growth scenario, as no spillover effects are 
generated. This implies more structural changes under exogenous growth than under the 
endogenous scenario, which in turn encourages overall production activities as well as 
stimulates the GDP and aggregate output. This situation benefits households, as they own the 
production factors. Income from both capital and labour increases and thus induces higher 
individual income variation.  
 
In the tax scenario, welfare varies positively with growth in both cases, though in a higher 
proportion under endogenous growth. Decreased growth diminishes the discount rate and thus 
depreciates the intertemporal income as compared with the reference case. A tax value that 
equals the auctioned permits price is slightly higher under endogenous growth in which 
productive activities decrease less and require more pollution permits; therefore, state income 
increases more due to environmental fiscal revenues and social transfers rise more under a 
situation of endogenous growth rather than under exogenous growth. 
 
3) Investment accounts show divergent effects depending on the environmental policy. 
Capital volume is higher under endogenous growth in the permit market scenario, but it is 
lower under endogenous growth in the tax scenario. 
In the permit scenario, investments increase with regards to both development and standard 
capital goods. Despite price increases, demand for development goods slightly improves due 
to spillover effects generated by positive variations in the growth rate. An opposite effect is 
seen in the tax scenario, in which demand for development goods decreases, generating fewer 
spillover effects. Improved R&D output could be obtained through state intervention aimed at 
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sustaining investments in development capital goods. A higher level of investment in 
conventional capital diminishes investments in the research; this is a situation that the 
literature has described as a “crowding out” effect (Nordhaus, 2002). The magnitude of a 
crowding out effect depends on the relative prices of standard and development goods and on 
elasticity of substitution between these two forms of investment. This issue raises the debate 
on whether conventional capital and development technology are substitutable or 
complementary (Buonanno et al., 2003). 
 
Under the free permit market simulation, the demand for development goods increases in 
sectors such as electricity, refineries, metallurgy, chemistry and constructions, but it drops in 
the remaining sectors. Note that sectors that diminish their activities (i.e., coal, gas and paper) 
invest less in capital goods, but sectors that increase their activities and still lower their 
demand for development goods benefit from the investments made by their suppliers. This is 
the case for two energy-intensive sectors, glass and cement, which undergo an increase in 
their demand for electricity and thus benefit from the investments in innovation made by the 
electricity sector. A higher variation in development capital is recorded in the electricity 
sector, which is the main energy supplier in the simulated economy. All sectors take 
advantage of improved competitiveness and are thus less likely to invest in development 
goods, as they benefit from the spillover effects generated by the electricity sector. In a 
similar context, Buonanno et al. (2003) showed that spillover effects reduce producer 
incentives to invest and encourage a “free-riding” attitude, since producers benefit from the 
innovations of their suppliers.  
Under the tax simulation, these implications are not valid, since on the one hand, a reduced 
growth rate limits the spillover effects and, on the other hand, fewer resources in all sectors 
diminish investment possibilities. 
 
4) The implementation of a permit market leads to price values close to the equilibrium price 
under endogenous and exogenous growth, although prices are slightly lower in the 
endogenous case (5.765 versus 5.766 euros). Even if the difference might appear 
insignificant, the total value of the market amounts to 13.1 M EUR, which corresponds to a 
volume of 2.28 M traded permits. Any variation in the permit price is thus significant given 
the volume of trade.  
The analysis focuses here on the qualitative impact of the permit trade under endogenous 
growth. The volume traded under the exogenous growth scenario is greater as compared to 
endogenous growth. Considering the increased activity under exogenous growth, the rise in 
the demand for polluting rights appears justified. Still, the abatement cost per unit of GDP is 
higher in the endogenous case. This result strengthens our finding that spillover effects reduce  
the incentive to invest in order to improve production technologies. This conclusion can be 
further extended: in fact, spillover effects negatively impact the incentive to reduce pollution. 
As endogenous growth provides additional productivity gains and involves fewer structural 
changes, the permit supply is lowered in all sectors.  
 
5) Both cases assume that environmental regulation begins in the year 2008 and that it is 
announced so that households can anticipate policy changes and adapt their behaviours, as 
explained above. Assuming exogenous growth, the long-term effects are similar whether the 
policy is announced or not. By contrast, the results are different under endogenous growth 
depending on whether the policy is announced or not. When the policy is announced, the 
long-term growth rate changes, affecting variables that are deflated with the growth rate. 
Consequently, the transition to a steady state is facilitated by these dynamics and is costless 
from both social and economic point of view (Goulder, 2004). While economic growth is 
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higher in this case, it negatively affects permit prices, as the supply of permit supply is 
diminished. Thus, the endogenous and exogenous growth versions of our model differ in this 
perspective, and it appears that the anticipations of agents have a more significant impact 
under the endogenous growth scenario than under exogenous growth.  
 
4. Conclusions and policy recommendations 
 
This research simulates the implementation of a CO2 tradable permit market in Romania in 
order to estimate the marginal abatement costs and the long-term economic impacts. An 
intertemporal general equilibrium model is applied using a dynamic approach based on the 
exogenous evolution of the active population and endogenous technological progress. The 
model structure assumes an infinitely-lived representative household, as in the Ramsey model 
(1928), and describes the innovation mechanism through which production and diffusion of 
knowledge occur, as in the Romer model (1990). Endogenous dynamics have sparked a large 
debate from both a modelling and a calibration point-of-view (Qayum, 2005). This is due to 
uncertainty regarding the validity of setting growth determinants. Although we have not 
clarified this complex issue, our research aims to better understand the relationship between 
fundamental innovation and marginal abatement cost in a carbon-constrained economy. An 
optimisation criteria-based approach allows us to estimate the level of carbon signal according 
to economic efficiency principles. This approach avoids the transfer of carbon prices onto the 
consumer as well as speculative actions on the permit market. Since economic evaluations are 
one of the many steps involved in policy-making processes, the following conclusions should 
be considered a starting point for defining short-term climate policies rather than a predictive 
description of the long-term evolution of the Romanian economy.  
 
Regarding the choice of market instrument upon which to base carbon policy, our model 
simulations show that implementing a permit scheme encourages economic growth because 
of the flexibility to abate emissions when it is relatively low-cost and because of the free 
distribution of tradable quotas. In contrast, introducing a carbon tax has a punishing impact on 
productive activities and economic growth, as it allocates fewer resources to sectors in order 
to invest in innovation. If a carbon tax is adopted, complementary measures should be 
adopted to recycle the collected revenue back into the economy, for instance, by reducing the 
payroll taxes of enterprises so as to benefit both producers and consumers. Recycling the tax 
product by lump-sum transfers to households would be less efficient (Goulder, 1994); as 
shown in our model, increased social transfers have had a positive impact on consumption but 
a limited effect on overall production.  
 
Consumer effects show an increase in individual consumption under both tax and permit 
policies, but these results vary regarding intertemporal welfare due to the different evolution 
of the discount rate. With regard to the energy policy, one notices a decrease in the volume of 
polluting resources and a rise in the consumption of electricity. Still, reducing the production 
of coal is not in line with Romania’s national strategy aimed at energy independency. Thus, 
this research supports clean coal projects, such as carbon capture and storage implementation, 
as a complement for investments in renewable-based power plants. Our results show that the 
tax policy is more appropriate for regulating energy use, but its decreased growth suggests 
that these positive effects could be due more to contractions in productive activities than to 
the efficient use of resources. As a short-term policy, the use of permits may be more 
appropriated during the transition period, while the tax policy may be an appropriate middle-
term or long-term strategy if it includes compensatory measures designed particularly for 
eligible sectors.  
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However, both policies have a negative impact on the public deficit that is strongly 
increasing, indicating that additional financing is necessary to ensure the financial health of 
the Romanian economy. Thus, public intervention remains essential, both in terms of 
regulation and financial support. The interaction between the two market inefficiencies, 
namely negative externalities due to pollution and positive externalities due to research 
spillover, requires a mix of public policies related to carbon targets and to aids to innovation 
by supporting the research and development sectors. The small difference between the results 
under endogenous and exogenous growth is the consequence of the low level of financial and 
human resources involved in Romanian R&D activities. In line with the Lisbon Agenda 
objectives that allow 3% of the EU GDP to R&D in 2010, Romania aims to increase research 
expenses from 0.4% of GDP in 2006 to 1% in 2010 (MEC, 2006). Our simulations support 
this policy aimed at eliminating barriers to knowledge diffusion as well as creating incentive 
for adopting innovative equipments, since a crowding out of R&D investments tends to 
favour cheaper conventional technologies.  
 
The role of knowledge diffusion is highlighted here by focusing on abatement costs: the 
spillover effects decrease these costs while increasing the ratio of abatement cost per unit of 
GDP. Still, technological diffusion has a positive impact on economic growth. The role of 
knowledge diffusion can further be explored by considering international spillover effects that 
emerge from transfers of technology between Romania and its trade partners in the EU. It 
may also be useful to consider various Kyoto mechanisms as joint implementation projects. 
With this regard, international spillover effects become the main argument for a global 
climate policy consisting in the development of clean mechanisms or joint implementation 
projects in developing countries. In this context, technological diffusion is a growth factor 
that compensates for negative externalities generated by polluting activities (Goulder and 
Mathai, 2000; Grubb and Kohler, 2002). Moreover, it is suggested that mechanisms of 
technological transfer represent one of lowest-cost abatement options (Rao et al., 2006).  
 
Contrary to the idea that countries in transition have growth priorities that overshadow their 
environmental concerns, this research shows that the two goals are not incompatible, because 
environmental policy can generate benefits that fuel economic growth processes. The tax and 
trade of emissions permits are the necessary tools for encouraging and intensifying initiatives 
for and benefits of climate policies. Romania has already engaged in a direction that will 
allow the country to avoid negative economic and social outcomes in the long-term. 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
I am very grateful to Daniel Thery and the two anonymous referees who provided numerous 
constructive comments and critical feedback, which led to the significant improvement of the 
paper. Responsibility for ideas expressed and any remaining errors are my own.  
 
References 
 
Aghion, P., Howitt, P., 1992. “A Model of Growth through Creative Destruction” 
Econometrica, 60(2): 323-351.  
Ambec, S., Barla, P., 2001, “Productivité et réglementation environnementale: une analyse de 
l’hypothèse de Porter”, Working Paper INRA-ESR n° 23, Grenoble.  
Armington, P.S., 1969, “A theory of demand for products distinguished by place of 
production”, IMF Staff Papers 16: 159-178. 
 21
Baker E., Clarke L., Shittu E., 2008, “Technical change and the marginal cost of abatement”, 
Energy Economics 30(6): 2799-2816.   
Barro, R. J., Sala-i-Martín, X., 1995, Economic Growth. New York, McGraw-Hill. 
Beaumais, O., 1995, “Une réinterprétation des politiques de l’environnement par les 
modèles”, PhD Thesis Université de Paris I Panthéon – Sorbonne. 
Böhringer, C., Löschel, A., Rutherford T.F., 2007, “Decomposing the integrated assessment 
of climate change”, Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control, 31: 683-702. 
Bohringer, C., Rutherford, T.F., 1997, “Carbon taxes with exemptions in an open economy: a 
general equilibrium analysis of the German tax initiative”, Journal of Environmental 
Economics and Management, 32: 189-203.  
Brooke, A., Kendrick, D., Meeraus, A., Raman, R., 1998, GAMS:  a user’s guide, GAMS 
Development Corporation, Washington.  
Buonanno, P., Carraro, C., Galeotti, M., 2003, “Endogenous induced technical change and the 
cost of Kyoto”, Resource and Energy Economics 25(1): 11-34. 
Burniaux, J.-M., Nicoletti, G., Oliveira-Martins, J., 1992, “GREEN: a Global Model for 
Quantifying the Costs of Policies to Curb CO2 Emissions”, OECD Economic Studies, 
19: 49-92. 
Lee, H., Oliveira-Martins, J., van der Mensbrugghe, D., 1994, The OECD GREEN model: an 
updated overview, Working Paper No. 97, OECD Development Centre. 
Cass, D., 1965, “Optimum growth in an aggregative model of capital accumulation”, Review 
of Economic Studies, 32: 233-240.  
Gillingham K., Newell R.G., Pizer, W.A., 2008, “Modeling endogenous technological change 
for climate policy analysis”, Energy Economics 30: 2734-2753. 
Goulder, L.H., 2004, Induced Technological Change and Climate Policy, Pew Center on 
Global Climate Change Report, Washington DC. 
Goulder, L.H., 1994, “Environmental taxation and the double dividend: a reader’s guide”, 
NBER Working Paper No. 4896. 
Goulder, L., Mathai, K., 2000, “Optimal CO2 abatement in the presence of induced technical 
change”, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 39: 1-38. 
Goulder, L.A., Schneider, S.H., 1999, “Induced technological change and the attractiveness of 
CO2 abatement policies”, Resource and Energy Economics, 21: 211-253.  
Grubb, M., Kohler, J., 2002, “Technical change and energy/environmental modelling”, 
Technology Policy and Environment, OECD.  
Grossman, G. M., Helpman, E., 1991, “Endogenous Product Cycles”, The Economic Journal 
101: 1214 - 1229. 
European Commission, 2008, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to improve and extend the greenhouse 
gas emissions allowance trading system of the Community’, COM(2008) 16 final 
2008/0013 (COD), Brussels. 
European Commission, 2007, Emissions trading: Commission approves Romania’s national 
allocation plans for 2007 and 2008-2012, IP/07/1612, Brussels.   
European Commission, 2003, Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and the 
Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission 
allowance trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 96/61EC.  
Ellerman, A.D, Decaux, A., 1998, Analysis of Post-Kyoto CO2 Emissions Trading Using 
Marginal Abatement Curves, MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global 
Change, Report 40, Cambridge MA. 
Ha-Duong, M., Grubb, M., Hourcade, J.C., 2004, “Influence of socioeconomic inertia and 
uncertainty on optimal CO2-emission abatement”, Pre- and Post-Print documents 
halshs-00002452_v1, HAL, CCSD. 
 22
Kemfert, C., Welsch, H., 2000, “Energy-Capital-Labor Substitution and the Economic Effects 
of CO2 Abatement: Evidence for Germany”, Journal of Policy Modelling 22(6): 641-
660.  
Kohler, J., Grubb, M., Popp, D., 2006, “The transition to endogenous technical change in 
climate-economy models: a technical overview to the innovation modeling comparison 
project”, The Energy Journal, Special issue: Endogenous Technological Change and the 
Economics of Atmospheric Stabilisation: 17-55. 
Koopmans, T.C., 1965, “On the concept of optimal economic growth”, in The Econometric 
Approach to Development Planning, Amsterdam.  
Lau, M.I., Pahlke, A., Rutherford, T.F., 2002, “Approximating infinite-horizon models in a 
complementarity format: a primer in dynamic general equilibrium analysis”, Journal of 
Economic Dynamics and Control, 26: 577-609.  
Lucas, R., 1988, “On the mechanics of economic  development”,  Journal of Monetary 
Economics, 22 : 3-42. 
Mage, S., 2004, “Ouverture commerciale et croissance : une analyse en équilibre général 
appliqué au cas de la Pologne”, PhD Thesis, Université de Paris Dauphine.  
Manne, A.S., Richels, R.G., 2002, “The impact of learning-by-doing on the timing and costs 
of CO2 abatement”, Working Paper, Stanford University, CA.  
McKibbin, W.J., Wilcoxen, P.J., 1995, “The Theoretical and Empirical Structure of the G-
Cubed Model”, Discussion Papers 118, Brookings Institution International Economics.  
Nadiri, M.I., Prucha, I.R., 1996, “Estimation of the Depreciation Rate of Physical and R&D 
Capital in the U.S. Total Manufacturing Sector”, Oxford University Press, 34(1): 43-56.  
NIS, National Institute of Statistics, 2006a, Conturi Nationale 2002-2003, Bucharest.  
NIS, National Institute of Statistics, 2006b, “Cercetare-dezvoltare si inovare”, Anuarul 
Statistic al Romaniei, Bucharest. 
Nordhaus,W.D., 2007a, “Critical assumptions in the Stern Review on climate change”, 
Science, 317: 201–202. 
Nordhaus,W.D., 2007b, The Challenge of Global Warming: Economic Models and 
Environmental Policy. Yale University. 
Nordhaus, W.D., 2002, “Modeling Induced Innovation in Climate Change Policy”, in A. 
Grubler, N. Nakicenovic et W.D. Nordhaus (eds.), Technological Change and the 
Environment, Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future.  
Nordhaus, W.D., 1999, “Modeling induced innovation in climate policy change in a putty-
semi-putty vintage world”, GEM-E3 Working Paper. 
Nordhaus, W.D., 1992, “An optimal transition path for controlling greenhouse gases”, 
Science, 258: 1315-1319.  
Otto V.M., Loschel A., Reilly J., 2008, “Directed technical change and differentiation of 
climate policy”, Energy Economics 30: 2855-2878. 
Piazolo D., 2000, “Poland’s membership in the European Union: an analysis with a dynamic 
CGE model”, LICOS, Discussion Paper 89. 
Popp, D., 2002, “Induced innovation and energy prices”, American Economic Review, 92(1): 
160-180.  
Porter, M., 1991, “American’s Green Strategy”, Scientific American, 264: 168. 
Qayum, A., 2005, “Endogenicity of economic growth models”, Technological Forecasting 
and Social Change 72: 75-84. 
Ramsey, Y.F., 1928, “A Mathematical Theory of Saving”, Economic Journal, 38: 543-559.  
Rao, S., Keppo, I., Riahi, K., 2006, “Importance of technological change and spillovers in 
long- term climate policy”, The Energy Journal, Special Issue: Endogenous 
Technological Change and the Economics of Atmospheric Stabilisation: 25-41. 
 23
RME, Romanian Ministry of Environment and Water Management, 2006a, Politica 
energetica a Romaniei in perioada 2006-2009. Energie sigura, accesibila si curata 
pentru Romania, Bucharest. 
RME, Romanian Ministry of Environment and Water Management, 2006b, Planul pentru 
promovarea eficientei energetice, Bucharest. 
RME, Romanian Ministry of Environment and Water Management, 2006c, Romanian 
National Allocation Plan for the periods 2007 and 2008-2012, Bucharest.  
RME, Romanian Ministry of Environment and Water Management, 2005, Report on 
demonstrable progress in implementing the Kyoto Protocol, Bucharest. 
RMT, Romanian Ministry of Trade, 2006, Cresterea competitivitatii economice. Bucharest.  
Romer, P.M., 1990, “Endogenous technological change”, Journal of Political Economy 98/5: 
71-102. 
Solow, R.M., 1956, “A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth”, Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, 70: 65-94.  
Stanculescu, S.M., Berevoescu, I., 2004, ‘Households, work and flexibility. Critical review of 
literature’, Edited by Claire Wallace, Report 2000-2003. 
Stern, N. et al., 2006, Stern Review: The Economics of Climate Change. HM Treasury, 
London.  
Sue Wing, I., 2003, “Induced technical change and the cost of climate policy”. Joint Program 
on the Science and Policy of Global Change Report no. 112. Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, Cambridge, MA. 
Tietenberg, T., Grubb, M., Michaelowa, A., Swift, B., Zhang, Z.X., 1999, “International 
Rules for Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading”, UNCTAD/GDS/GFSB/ Misc.6 United 
Nations, Genève. 
Weyant, J.P., Olavson, T., 1999, “Issues in modeling induced technological change in energy, 
environment, and climate policy”, Environmental Modeling and Assessment, 4(2,3) : 67-
85. 
Wigley, T., Richels, R., Edmonds, J., 1996, “Economic and Environmental Choices in the 
Stabilization of Atmospheric CO2 Concentrations”, Nature, 18: 240-243.  
Tol, R.S.J., Yohe, GW., 2008, “The Stern Review: A deconstruction”, Energy Policy, 
doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2008.11.008. 
 
 
 
 
 24
Appendix 1. The nested production function  
 
Appendix 2. Model equations 
 
Households  
 
( )
( )
( )
1
1
1
,
8 /
8 1 /
9 /
/ (1 )(1 )(1 )
(1
j
j
cdicdi
j j j j j j
cdicdi
j j j j j j
cc
j t j t j t
css impo
t t t t
j j
goodhd goodh A h pcgood pcgoodd
goodhi goodh A h pcgood pcgoodi
goodh C A cid pc pcgood
lorm lh C pc w
pcgoodd pp
σσ
σσ
σσ
σ
α
α
α
β β τ τ
−
−
−
=
⎡ ⎤= −⎣ ⎦
= ⋅
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤− = ⋅ − − −⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
=
, , , , , ,
, ,
)(1 )
(1 )(1 )(1 )
/
mcs tva acc svb
j j j j
mcs ddd tva acc svb
j t j j j j j
j t j t j t j t j t j t
t t j t j t
j
t t t t t t
pcgoodi tc pw
pcgood goodh goodhd pcgoodd goodhi pcgoodi
pc C pcgood goodh
TRS SavH props SVD pk KH w lh
τ τ τ τ
τ τ τ τ τ
+ + + +
= ⋅ ⋅ + + + + +
= +
=
= − + ⋅ + ⋅
∑
( )
1
1
1
1 1
1 1
1
(1 )(1 )
1
1 (1 )(1 )1
(1 )(1 )
1
1 (1 )(1 )
t t
css impo
t t t t t t t t t t t
t
css impo
tt t
t t
t t
css impo
t
TREH
SavH SVD pk KH w lh TRS TREH pc C TRHE
pc
wr pcC C
n pc pc
w
σ
σ
σθ
σ
τ τ
ββ β β τ τ
ρ ββ β β τ τ
−
++
+ −
+ +
+
+
= + ⋅ + − − + + − −
⎡ ⎛ ⎞− + ⎜ ⎟− − −⎛ ⎞+ ⎝ ⎠= ⋅⎜ ⎟+ + ⎛ ⎞⎝ ⎠ − + ⎜ ⎟− − −⎝ ⎠⎣
( )
[ ]
11 1
/( 1)(1 )(1 ) (1 ) / (1 )T Tg n r
σθ
σθσ
σ σθρ
⎛ ⎞− +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
+
⎤⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎦
+ + = + +
 
Final good sector  
        KLEj                      Mj
    Lj          KEj  
           Kdevj    Kj     Ej   domj  impj ...….. domj   impj 
               Electrj     Coalj   Oilj          Gasj
B5j ………….…. B14j
CES 
Leontief 
Armington 
CES
Armington 
CES 
   domj  impj  domj impj domj impj domj impj 
   Yj 
(5) 
 
 
(4) 
 
 
(3) 
 
 
(2) 
 
 
 
(1) 
Leontief 
 CO2 Permit /Tax 
 
 25
( )
( )
( )
1
, , , , , , , ,
1
, , , , , ,
1
, , , , , , , , ,
1
, ,
1 /
1 (1 ) /
2 /
3 (1
ii
i
i
jj
j
d id i
i j t i j t j i i j t i j t
d id i m c s i
i j t i j t j i i j t t j i
ee
i j t j t j i j j t i j t i i j j t
k e
j t j t j
c id o m c in A d i p c i p p in
c im p c in A d i p c i tc p w
c in E A e p e p c i n e m i m
E K E A
σσ
σσ
σσ
σ
α
α τ
α β α
α
−
−
−
−
=
⎡ ⎤= − ⋅⎣ ⎦
= +
= −( )
( )
, ,
1
, , , ,
11 / 11 1 11 1 1
, , , 1 ,
1
, , , ,
) /
3 /
3 (1 ) / (1 )
4 (1 ) /
j
jj
j
k e
j j t j t
k ek e
j t j t j j j t j t
k e
k e k e k e
j t j j j t j j t j j t T j t
k le
j t j t j j j t j t
k p k e p e
K K E A k p k e r k
K E A k K e n E k e n A t g b iv h t
K E K L E A l p k le p k e
σ
σσ
σ
σ σ σ
σ
α
α α α α
α
−
⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠− − −
−
−
=
⎡ ⎤= + + − − +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤= −⎣ ⎦
( )1, , , ,
, ,
, ,
, , , , , , ,
, , , , ,
, , , , , , ,
4 /
/
/
1 4
2
j
jj
k le
k lek le
j t j t j j j t j t
j t j t j
j t j t j
j t i j t i j j t j t j j t
i j
i j t i j i j t
i j t i j t i t i j t t j
L K L E A l p k le p l
K L E O k le
M O m
O c id o m I g o o d h d in v d o m d g d x
C O c o e f c in
p c i c in p p in c id o m tc p w
σ
σσ α
α
α
τ
−=
=
=
= + + + +
=
= + ⋅ ⋅
∑ ∑
, ,
, , , , , ,
, , , , , ,
, , , , , 1 ,
, , , , , ,
, , , , ,
(1 ) / (1 )
m c s i
i i j t
j t j t i i j t i j t
i
j t j t i i j t i j t
i
s d
j t j t j t j j t j t t t t T j t
j t j t j t j t j t j t
j t j t j t j t j t
c im p
p e E e c in p c i
p m M n e c in p c i
p k e K E K r k E p e p m o n A t g b iv h t
p k le K L E L p l K E p k e
p p O p m M K r
β
β
τ −
=
=
= + + − +
= +
= +
∑
∑
( )
, , , , 1 ,
,
, , ,
(1 ) / (1 )
(1 )
1 1 4
s d
j j t j t j t j t t t t T j t
c s e
j t t j
m c s
i t j t j i j
j
k E p e L p l p m o n A t g b iv h t
p l w d ifc
p p in p p I
τ
τ
τ
−+ + + − +
= + ⋅
= +∑
Investment 
 26
( )
( )
( )
1
, , ,
1
, , ,
1
, ,
, ,
5 / (1 )
5 1 / (1 )
6 /
jj
jj
invdiinvdi mcs
j t j j j j t j t j
invdiinvdi mcs
j t j t j j j t t j
invinv
j t t j t j t
j t j t
invdom inv A iv pinvdi pp
invimp inv A iv pinvdi tc pw
inv InvtS A ivt pinv pinvdi
pinvdi inv
σσ
σσ
σσ
α τ
α τ
α
−
−
−
⎡ ⎤= +⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤= − ⋅ +⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
= ⋅
( )
[ ]
[ ]
, , ,
, ,
,
, 1 ,
,
(1 )( )
(1 )
(1 ) / (1 )(1 )
(1 )(1 ) (1 )
mcs
j j t t j j t j t
t t j t j t
j
t t t
impr svp
j t t j j
j t t T j t
j j
j T T T
j
invimp tc pw invdom pp
pinv InvtS inv pinvdi
pk pinv r
rk pk
K InvtS n g K
K n g InvtS
τ
δ
τ τ
δ
δ
+
= + ⋅ +
⋅ =
= +
= + +
= + − + +
+ + − − =
∑
∑ ∑
∑
 
Research sector  
1
1
1
1
1
(1 ) (1 )
(1 ) (1 )(1 )
(1 ) (1 )
sr
t t t t
sr
t t t
t t t
r r
t t t
r r
T T T
glt w Lr r prd At
glt pk Kr r prd At
glt At g At
g Lr Kr
g Lr Kr
α α
α α
τ α
τ α
γ
γ
−
−
−
−
−
+ = + ⋅ ⋅
+ ⋅ = + −
+ = +
=
=
 
Development sector 
( )
( )
( )
1
,
1
, , , ,
1
, , ,
7 / 4
5 /
5 (1 ) / ( )
/ ; / ; / ;
jj
jj
jj
ee
j t t j t t j j t
ivdiivdi
j t j t j j t j t
ivdiivdi
j t j t j j t t j
t t t t t t t
civ Eiv A civ peiv pciv dv Miv
civdom civ A iv pciv pp
civimp civ A iv pciv tc pw
Kiv Yiv vk Liv Yiv vl Miv Yiv vm Eiv
σσ
σσ
σσ
α β α
α
α
α α α
−
−
−
= +
=
= −
= = =
( )
, , , , ,
, , , ,
,
/
;
/ 1 1/
/
t
j t j t j t j t j t t
t t j j t j t t t j j t j t
j j
t t t t t t t t t
t t
t t t j t
j
t
Yiv ve
pciv civ civdom pp civimp tc pw
peiv Eiv en civ pp pmiv Miv nen civ pp
piv Yiv pk Kiv w Liv Eiv peiv Miv pmiv
pmon piv ke
pmon piv un bivht
Yiv
α
β β
σ
π
=
= +
= =
= ⋅ + + +
= −
= +
=
∑ ∑
∑
, 1
1
1
/ (1 )
( ) / (1 )
(1 ) ; /
j t t T
j
t t t t T
t t t t T T T
bivht At g
SVD pmon pbiv At g
prd un r prd r un prdπ π
−
−
+
+
= − +
+ = + =
∑
 
State 
 27
, , , ,
,
[ ( ) ( )
( (1 ) )
( )
cse impr svp tva acc svb
t j t j t j j j t j j j j t j t
j
ddd tva acc svb tva acc svb
j j j j j j j j t t j
css impo css impo
t t j j j j t t t
t t j j
IS w l pk K goodhd pp
goodhi tc pw
w lh pk KS TRES
SavS IS dgd pp
τ τ τ τ τ τ
τ τ τ τ τ τ τ
τ τ τ τ
= ⋅ + + ⋅ + + + +
+ + + + + + +
+ − + ⋅ +
= −
∑
( ), (1 ) (1 )mcs mcst j j t j j t t
j
dgi tc pw TRS TRSEτ τ+ + ⋅ + − −∑
 
Rest of the world 
( )
,
,
, , , , ,
, , ,
14
0 (1 )
x
j t
j t j
t j
j i j t i j j t j t j
i j
mcs
t j j t j t j j t t t t
j
pp
x xin
tc pw
import cimp I imph invimp dgi
tc pw import pp x w lm w lx TRXE
σ
τ
⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⋅⎝ ⎠
= + + +
= ⋅ ⋅ − + + ⋅ − ⋅ +
∑∑
∑
 
Equilibrium 
( )
,
,
,
, 1
(1 )
(1 ) (1 ) / (1 )
j t t t t
j
j t t t t t
j
sd
t j t t t t t t t
j
mcs mcs sr
t t j j t j j t j t t t T t
j
t
l lr liv lx lh lm
K Kr Kiv Yiv KH KS KE
pk K Kr Kiv mon Yiv pk KH KS KE
SavS IS dgd pp dgi tc pw TRS TRSE SVD At g prd
SavE
π τ
τ τ τ
τ
−
+ + + = +
+ + + = + +
⎛ ⎞+ + + − = + +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
= − + + + − − − − +
=
∑
∑
∑
∑
, , , , , ,
, , , ,
[( ) ( )
( ) ( (1 ))]
mcs ddd
j j t j t j t j t j t t j j t t
j
tva acc svb ddd
j j j h j j t h j t t j
h
t
t t t t t
o civdom pp import civimp tc pw imph tc pw
domh pp imph tc pw
pk KE TRHE TRSE TRXE TREH TRES
walras pinv InvS piv Yiv pr
τ
τ τ τ τ
− + − ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅
+ + + + ⋅ +
+ ⋅ + + + − −
= + +
∑
∑
1 / (1 ) ( )t t T t t td A g SavS SavH SavE− + − + +
 
Parameters and exogenous variables 
 
A1, A2, A3, A4, A5, A6, A7, A8, A9 - scale parameters in CES function           
, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,di en l k e kle m mi r iv h cid civ dv vk vl ve vmα α α α α α α α α α α α α α α α α α β  -  share 
parameters  
, , , , , , ,di e ke kle ivdi c xσ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ - elasticity rates   
( )j jen nenβ β  - energy (non energy) input vector in sector j 
( )i ie neβ β  - vector of energy (non energy) goods of type i 
coef – CO2 emission coefficient  
δ  - capital depreciation rate    
γ - scale parameter  
jiI ,14  - unit matrix   
props - saving propensity of households  
ρ  - time preference rate 
acc
jτ - excise rate  
cssτ  - social cotisation rate 
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cse
jτ  - payroll tax rate  
ddd
jτ - custom duty rate 
impr
jτ  - tax rate on production 
impoτ  - tax rate on individual income  
mcs
jτ ( mcsiiτ ) - services and commercial margins in production (consumption) 
sd
tτ  - subsidy rate for the development sector 
srτ   - subsidy rate for research 
svp
jτ ( svbjτ ) – subsidy rate for production (consumption) 
svmτ  - subsidiy rate for households 
tva
jτ - VAT rate  
θ  - intertemporal substitution elasticity   
KE, KS – firms and state capital  
lm (lx)   - supply (demand) labor from the rest of the world  
lorm  - labor norm  
pw - world price 
TREH - transfers from firms to households   
TRHE - transfers from households to firms  
TRES - transfers from firms to state   
TRXE  - transfers from the rest of the wolrd to firms  
jxin  - reference exports  
Households  
C – aggregated consumption   
jcidomh  - good consumption from sector j  
goodhd (goodhi) – domestic (imported) good consumption   
SavH, SavE,  SavS – saving of households, firms and state 
lh  - labor supply  
pcgood - consumption price for the good j 
pcgoodd- consumption price for the domestic good j  
pcgoodi- consumption price for the imported good j 
pc – aggregated consumption price  
TRS - social transfers  
KH, KS, KE - dividends received by households, state and firms 
Final good sector  
jbivht - demand for development investment goods   
jicidom , ( jicimp , )- domestic (imported) input demand  
- input demand  
jE - energy demand  
jK - capital demand  
jKLE - aggregated capital-labor-energy demand 
jL - labor demand 
jM - non-energy demand  
jO - output 
jicin ,
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jrk - gros capital price  
jipci , - input price  
jpe - energy input price   
jpl - gros labor cost  
jpm - non-energy input price  
jpp - production cost   
ippin - input price  
w  - wage  
Research sector 
At  - knowledge stock  
g  - growth rate   
Tg - growth rate at the final period  
Kr  - capital demand 
Lr  - labor demand 
prd - patent price  
Development sector 
jciv  - input demand  
jcivdom ( jcivimp ) – domestic (imported) input demand  
Eiv - aggregated energy demand 
Kiv - capital demand 
Liv - labor demand 
Miv  - aggregated non-energy demand  
Yiv - output  
jpciv  - input price 
peiv - price of the aggregated energy demand  
pmiv - price of the aggregated non energy demand  
pmon - monopoly price  
piv - production price 
unπ  - unitary profit  
SVD - subsidies  
Investment 
jinvdom ( jinvimp ) - domestic (imported) investment good supply   
InvtS - aggregated standard investment supply 
pinv - standard investment price 
jpinvdi - price of the investment good j  
pk - capital price 
r  -  interest rate 
State 
dgd (dgi) – domestic (imported) consumption  
IS – income  
, ,VAT DDD ACC  - value added taxes, customs and excise duties   
difc - adjustment variable for the state budget neutrality    
Rest of the world 
jimport - imports in the sector j  
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tc   - exchange rate   
jx - exports  
 
Appendix 3. Simulations results (%, reference = 0) 
Permit market CO2 Tax 
Variable Exogenous 
dynamics 
Endogenous 
dynamics 
Exogenous 
dynamics 
Endogenous 
dynamics 
Real GDP   0.08 0.06 -0.06 -0.01 
Aggregated output 0.34 0.32 -0.88 -0.84 
Permit price/ Taxe (€/tCO2) 5.77 5.77 3.80 3.81 
Industrial CO2 emissions -15.16 -15.16 -15.83 -15.82 
ETS sectors' emissions -20,7 -20,7 -20,7 -20,7 
Total CO2 emissions -14.41 -14.42 -15.18 -15.17 
Energy inputs 2.06 2.06 -5.87 -5.85 
Total energy demand 2.30 2.29 -4.86 -4.84 
Energy intensity 2.13 2.15 -5.87 -5.88 
Energy dependency -4.45 -4.43 0.35 0.32 
Growth Rate - 0.15 - -0.33 
Saving (total) 0.25 0.29 0.02 -0.07 
Households saving -0.53 -0.51 -0.75 -0.81 
Enterprises saving 0.03 0.00 0.35 0.41 
Public deficit 12.56 12.85 12.24 11.74 
Total investment (volume) 0.42 0.46 0.17 0.09 
Standard investment 0.42 0.46 0.17 0.09 
Research output  - -0.04 - -0.05 
Development goods - 0.01 - -1.28 
Standard capital price -0.16 -0.16 -0.15 -0.15 
Patent price   - 0.12 - -0.40 
Development investment price - 0.09 - 0.79 
Development investment cost - 0.09 - 0.79 
Interest rate   0.00 0.03 0.00 -0.06 
Imports   0.06 0.06 0.13 0.13 
Exports   -0.27 -0.29 -1.03 -1.00 
Exchange rate -0.31 -0.32 -0.75 -0.73 
Equivalent Variation 0.06 -0.13 0.05 0.28 
Households consumption 0.17 0.13 0.49 0.58 
Consumer price index -0.13 -0.13 -0.05 -0.06 
Total income 0.03 0.00 0.35 0.41 
Wage income 0.01 0.02 -0.06 -0.07 
Capital income 0.98 0.87 0.39 0.62 
Monopoly profits - 0.11 - -0.50 
Social transfers -1.81 -1.92 2.92 3.11 
Employment   0.01 0.02 -0.06 -0.07 
 
 
